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Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and the Second
Monster
Eric L. Muller*
Introduction
It is a trope at least as old as Beowulf: the unexpected second monster.
Beowulf arrives in Heorot to take on Grendel, the demon who has been
terrorizing the Ring-Danes’ mead-hall. He bests the monster in battle and
Grendel slinks off, one-armed and bloodied, to die. The Ring-Danes honor
Beowulf with a great banquet; he has slaughtered their nemesis and there is
much to celebrate. Full of mead and a newfound sense of safety, the revelers
drift off to sleep. That is when a terrible new monster bursts upon the scene—
Grendel’s mother, the beast that brought Grendel into the world. The RingDanes will suffer further death and havoc until Beowulf can subdue her.
Unexpected second monsters can appear in real life as well, and the
Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Trump v. Hawaii1 may have set us up for
one. In his opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Roberts put the long-enfeebled
precedent of Korematsu v. United States2 out of its—and our—misery. Of
that notorious decision upholding the mass removal of Japanese-Americans
from the West Coast, the Chief Justice said this: it “was gravely wrong the
day it was decided, has been overruled in the court of history, and—to be
clear—‘has no place in law under the Constitution.’”3
A nemesis has been slaughtered and there is much to celebrate.4 But this
is not a moment for mead and peaceful slumber. Around the corner awaits
another monster, a bigger threat than Korematsu itself. I am referring to
Hirabayashi v. United States,5 the Supreme Court’s 1943 decision
unanimously upholding the dusk-to-dawn curfew imposed on JapaneseAmericans a few weeks before the mass removal orders of Korematsu. The
Hirabayashi decision preceded Korematsu by eighteen months and did the
doctrinal work necessary to support the military’s actions; the Justices in the

* For offering comments on drafts of this Essay, I thank Bill Marshall, Joe Kennedy, Carissa
Hessick, Manoj Mate, Geoffrey Stone, and participants at the October 2018 meeting of the Western
Law Professors of Color and the Conference of Asian Pacific American Law Faculty. I’m deeply
indebted to Will Cauley for outstanding research assistance.
1. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
2. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
3. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2423 (quoting Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 248 (1944)
(Jackson, J., dissenting)).
4. As will be noted, not everyone’s mood has been celebratory. See infra note 69 and
accompanying text.
5. 320 U.S. 81 (1943).

MULLER.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

736

3/23/2020 1:13 PM

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 98:735

Korematsu majority made clear that they felt constrained to uphold mass
removal “in light of the principles we announced in the Hirabayashi case.”6
Hirabayashi was Korematsu’s progenitor as Grendel’s mother was
Grendel’s.
Yet Hirabayashi has gone unnoticed. In the decades after the war,
Korematsu drew all of the attention, perhaps because the burdens it endorsed
were the more extreme, or perhaps because it formulated its legal rule a bit
more crisply, or perhaps because it—rather than Hirabayashi—was the case
that generations of law students encountered in their constitutional law
casebooks. Until Trump v. Hawaii, we were ominously reminded time and
again in the literature that Korematsu had “never actually been overruled.”7
We find no such reminder in those pages about Hirabayashi. This is troubling
on its own, and even more so because judges and lawyers have continued to
cite Hirabayashi without evident shame.8
This Essay is a warning. Some today are celebrating Korematsu’s
demise; others maintain that Trump v. Hawaii actually revived it. But all of
that is a distraction. While the debate swirls, the dangerous Hirabayashi
decision hides in plain sight, its reasoning unexamined and its holding
unassailed. We should attend to Korematsu’s mother now, lest she attend to
us later.
I.

Enter the First Monster

Korematsu v. United States was a constitutional challenge to an Armyimposed order on all West Coast people of Japanese ancestry under the
authority of President Roosevelt’s Executive Order 9066.9 The order required
them to leave military zones the Army established along the coast after the
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor—effectively the whole of the three states
bordering the Pacific Ocean along with a slice of Arizona.10 Fred Korematsu,
6. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 217.
7. See COMM’N ON WARTIME RELOCATION AND INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS, PERSONAL
JUSTICE DENIED 239 (Univ. of Wash. Press 1997) (relating to the government’s own findings of
lack of military necessity); David A. Harris, On the Contemporary Meaning of Korematsu: “Liberty
Lies in the Hearts of Men and Women,” 76 MO. L. REV. 1, 12 (2011) (noting “Korematsu remains
‘good law’”); Dean Masaru Hashimoto, The Legacy of Korematsu v. United States: A Dangerous
Narrative Retold, 4 ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 72, 84 (1996) (“The celebration of the end of Korematsu’s
reign is premature; Korematsu lives.”); Sandra L. Lynch, Constitutional Integrity: Lessons from the
Shadows, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 623, 635–36 (2017) (suggesting that a mere “confession of error” by a
Solicitor General “does not overrule a case that was wrongly decided”); see also United States v.
Chalk, 441 F.2d 1277, 1283 (4th Cir. 1971) (citing Korematsu to support the proposition that
“freedom of travel like freedom of speech may be subject to reasonable limitations as to time and
place”).
8. See infra notes 119–126 and accompanying text.
9. Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407, 1474 (Feb. 19, 1942).
10. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 214, 220 (referencing “Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34” as the
order violated by Fred Korematsu).
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a twenty-three-year-old American citizen of Japanese ancestry, defied the
order by going into hiding in early May of 1942 rather than presenting
himself for removal.11 Later that month he was apprehended on a street in
San Leandro.12 The federal prosecutor charged him with the federal
misdemeanor13 of “knowingly . . . remain[ing] in th[e] . . . [m]ilitary
[a]rea . . . which all persons of Japanese ancestry are excluded from.”14 A
different Army order required people of Japanese ancestry to submit to
detention at what the government euphemistically called “assembly
centers,”15 but the prosecutor did not charge Korematsu with violating that
order.16 A trial in a San Francisco federal district court in September 1942
resulted in his conviction.17
After a first trip to the Supreme Court in 1943 on a procedural
question,18 Korematsu’s challenge to his conviction went before the Supreme
Court in oral argument on October 11 and 12, 1944.19 Korematsu attacked
the constitutionality of not only the order excluding him from his home but
also the order requiring him to report for detention; the two, he argued,
operated in tandem.20 Excluded Japanese-Americans could not wander where
they wished, he argued; they could only submit to detention.21 The
government, on the other hand, urged the Court to address only the
misconduct that was charged in the information—his defiance of the
exclusion order.22
On December 18, 1944, by a 6–3 vote, the Court upheld the
constitutionality of the exclusion order,23 breaking off the question of
detention for resolution in a different case on the same day, Ex parte Endo.24
11. PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR 93–96 (1983).
12. Id. at 93.
13. Act of Mar. 21, 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-503, 56 Stat. 173. This statute made it a federal offense
for a person to knowingly defy an Army order entered pursuant to Executive Order 9066.
14. Docket Filing 1 at 1–2, United States v. Korematsu, No. 27635W (N.D. Cal. filed June 12,
1942), https://catalog.archives.gov/id/296048 [https://perma.cc/J5KS-6RWB?type=image].
15. Civilian Restrictive Order No. 1, 8 Fed. Reg. 982 (Jan. 21, 1943).
16. See Docket Filing 1, supra note 14, at 1–2 (charging Korematsu with a violation of a
different order, “Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34”).
17. IRONS, supra note 11, at 152–53.
18. Korematsu v. United States, 319 U.S. 432, 435–36 (1943). The procedural question was
whether an order imposing a sentence of probation was “final and appealable.” The Court held that
it was. Id. at 436.
19. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
20. Brief for Appellant at 30–31, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (No. 22).
21. Id. at 28–30.
22. Brief for the United States at 28–29, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)
(No. 22).
23. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 219.
24. 323 U.S. 283 (1944). The Endo Court held that the War Relocation Authority had no
statutory power to continue to detain loyal Japanese-Americans in the camps. Id. at 297. Though
one often hears it said that the Supreme Court upheld the “internment” of Japanese-Americans in
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Justice Black’s opinion for the Court opened with the words that would
ensure its spot in generations of law school case books: “It should be
noted . . . that all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single
racial group are immediately suspect . . . [and] courts must subject them to
the most rigid scrutiny.”25 This was something new, at least in linguistic
formulation—the first appearance of what would come to be called “strict
scrutiny.” One might see this as the moment when the Court made good on
its famously footnoted hint of six years earlier that a “more searching judicial
inquiry” might be appropriate in cases challenging government action
“directed at particular . . . racial minorities.”26
But it was all downhill from there. Korematsu argued, among other
things,27 that Congress had not “authorize[d] the military commander to
select citizens upon an ancestral basis for removal from military areas, to
segregate and quarantine them and to detain them in concentration camps,”28
that the exclusion order did not provide even the rudiments of fair process,29
and that the order embodied racial discrimination barred by the equality
norms of due process.30 He pointed out to the Court that there were no Army
orders excluding American citizens of German or Italian ancestry from any
zone, even though the nation was at war with Germany and Italy.31 And he
emphasized that there was no valid reason to cast indiscriminate suspicion of
disloyalty and subversiveness on every Japanese-American.32
The “most rigid scrutiny” promised by the Court turned out to be
anything but. Justice Black could not find a government assertion about the
necessity of the exclusion order that he would not credit. There was,
according to military authorities, “an unascertained number of disloyal
members of the group”33 along the coast, and “it was impossible to bring

Korematsu v. United States, that is mistaken. Korematsu said nothing about the constitutionality of
detention, and when the Court did address detention, it disapproved of it on non-constitutional
grounds. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 222–23.
25. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216.
26. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
27. Korematsu’s attorney unleashed a barrage of constitutional claims in his brief, most of
which were spurious. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 20, at 46–50 (arguing, among other things,
that the exclusion order amounted to slavery and cruel punishment in violation of the 8th and 13th
Amendments).
28. Brief for Appellant, supra note 20, at 42.
29. Id. at 49.
30. Id. at 48. The “reverse incorporation” of the equal protection clause—making it applicable
to the federal government through the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment—was still ten
years away. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) (“[R]acial segregation in the public
schools of the District of Columbia is a denial of the due process of law guaranteed by the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution.”).
31. Brief for Appellant, supra note 20, at 57, 64.
32. Id. at 65.
33. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 218 (1944).
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about an immediate segregation of the disloyal from the loyal.”34 “[B]ecause
the properly constituted military authorities feared an invasion of our West
Coast,”35 Black reasoned, the “exclusion of the whole group was . . . a
military imperative.”36 “[W]ere [Korematsu] a case involving the
imprisonment of a loyal citizen in a concentration camp because of racial
prejudice,” he said, the Court’s “task would be simple” and its “duty clear.”37
But the case was about exclusion, not detention, and “Korematsu was not
excluded . . . because of hostility to him or his race.”38 Rather, said Justice
Black, he was excluded because we were at war with Japan, military
authorities “feared an invasion of our West Coast,” and “military urgency . . .
demanded that all citizens of Japanese ancestry be segregated from the West
Coast temporarily.”39
It was a blunt syllogism: Race implied danger; time was short; danger
and time pressure permitted exclusion, or, as Justice Jackson put it in dissent,
“transplanting American citizens.”40 If the peril in the majority’s reasoning
was lost on any reader of Black’s opinion, Jackson’s dissent remedied that
quickly. Racial discrimination and mass uprootings, he pointed out, were
things that the Court “validated” not just for the specific moment but “for all
time.”41 Thus endorsed, “The principle [would] lie[ ] about like a loaded
weapon ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible
claim of an urgent need.”42
Thus did the first monster strike.
II.

The First Monster Is Slain

As things turned out, the monster would not strike again. The reasoning
supporting Korematsu’s endorsement of the mass exclusion of JapaneseAmericans never served as the foundation for any future Supreme Court
judgment.43 The likely reasons are many. The most obvious is that the

34. Id. at 219.
35. Id. at 223.
36. Id. at 219.
37. Id. at 223.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 246 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. The most it received was mentions in passing. E.g., Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1884
(2017) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 351 (2003) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 507 (1980)
(Powell, J., concurring); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 541 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Greene
v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 516 (1959) (Clark, J., dissenting); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 107
(1958) (Brennan, J., concurring); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 128 (1958); Shaughnessy v. United
States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 222 n.5 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting); Youngstown Sheet &
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government never again uprooted and relocated a racial group, so no case “on
all fours” ever materialized. Scholarly assessment of the Korematsu decision
started out critical—in 1945, Eugene Rostow called it “a disaster” in the Yale
Law Journal44—and it only grew worse from there.45 The excesses of the
Second Red Scare eroded public support for the arrest and detention of
American citizens on national security grounds.46 A 1980s congressional
commission examining the wartime removal and detention of JapaneseAmericans harshly condemned the Korematsu ruling.47 And of course the
whole fabric of equal protection law was rewoven and tightened in the
decades after the war, leaving the Korematsu Court’s oddly lenient
application of strict scrutiny ever more peculiar.48
Another blow came late in 1983, when a federal district court granted
Fred Korematsu a writ of error coram nobis invalidating his 1942
conviction.49 Intrepid archival work by activists and historians revealed that
in litigating the case in the Supreme Court, the Department of Justice
suppressed information casting doubt on some of its evidence that JapaneseAmericans posed a security risk.50 In particular, a key government report
justifying exclusion alleged that Japanese-Americans had been involved in
ship-to-shore signaling with Japanese submarines; the Justice Department

Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 661 n.3 (1952) (Clark, J., concurring in judgment); Harisiades
v. Shaugnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 589 n.16 (1952); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 34 (1949)
(Jackson, J., dissenting).
44. Eugene V. Rostow, The Japanese-American Cases—A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489 (1945);
see also Nanette Dembitz, Racial Discrimination and the Military Judgment: The Supreme Court’s
Korematsu and Endo Decisions, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 175, 183 (1945) (calling Korematsu a
“dangerous opinion . . . not in fact justified by considerations of sound policy lying either within or
without the issues of the case”).
45. See generally ROGER DANIELS, THE JAPANESE AMERICAN CASES (2013) (discussing how
the Supreme Court neglected its duty to interpret the Constitution, thereby allowing racism and fear
to fuel a national tragedy); Jerry Kang, Denying Prejudice: Internment, Redress, and Denial, 51
UCLA L. REV. 933 (2004) (exploring the Judiciary’s role in the imprisonment of JapaneseAmericans and its failure to accept responsibility for that tragic mistake); Jonathan M. Justl, Note,
Disastrously Misunderstood: Judicial Deference in the Japanese-American Cases, 119 YALE L.J.
270 (2009) (suggesting that the Supreme Court exercised little perception deference and complete
means deference with regard to the Japanese-American cases).
46. By passing the Non-Detention Act in 1971, 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a), which repealed the
McCarran Internal Security Act of 1950 and forbade the federal detention of a citizen except
pursuant to an Act of Congress, legislators invoked the memory of the removal and imprisonment
of Japanese-Americans. 117 CONG. REC. 31, 541 (1971).
47. COMM’N ON WARTIME RELOCATION AND INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS, supra note 7, at
237–39.
48. See DONALD W. JACKSON, EVEN THE CHILDREN OF STRANGERS: EQUALITY UNDER THE
U.S. CONSTITUTION 83 (1992) (noting that “[t]he wartime Japanese-American cases aside,” the
Supreme Court was coming to view race as an “inappropriate basis for treating people differently”).
This was the case even before Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
49. Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1420 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
50. IRONS, supra note 11, at 202–06.
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had evidence that this was erroneous but did not alert the Supreme Court.51
As well, the government failed to inform the Court that an anonymously
published intelligence report asserting that Japanese-Americans were
overwhelmingly loyal was actually a product of the Office of Naval
Intelligence.52 On the strength of these deceptions, Judge Marilyn Hall Patel
of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California concluded
that Korematsu’s conviction must be set aside.53 The government did not
appeal. Of course, the coram nobis writ could wipe away only Fred
Korematsu’s criminal conviction from 1942, not the Supreme Court’s 1944
decision affirming it. But there is little doubt that the disclosures of
government misconduct underlying the coram nobis writ had the effect of
further sapping the Supreme Court opinion of vitality.
Korematsu’s authority continued to wane in the 1990s and the early
2000s. In 1998, President Bill Clinton awarded Fred Korematsu the Medal of
Freedom.54 Senators on the Judiciary Committee regularly began probing
Supreme Court nominees for their views on whether Korematsu was still
good law.55 And in 2011, Acting Solicitor General Neal Katyal issued a
“Confession of Error” owning up to the deceptions practiced by the wartime
Solicitor General’s Office in the Japanese-American cases.56
The death blow to Korematsu finally came in June 2018 when the
Supreme Court decided Trump v. Hawaii, the challenge to the so-called
“travel ban” on entry to the United States that the Trump Administration
imposed on noncitizens from certain mostly Muslim-majority nations. After
51. See id. at 282–84, 286.
52. It is often said that the government “suppressed” the report itself, but that is misleading. The
report was published as an article in Harper’s in October of 1942 as the work of an anonymous
intelligence officer who had permission from the military to go public with it. The Japanese in
America: The Problem and the Solution, HARPER’S MAG., Oct. 1942, at 489–90. Two amicus curiae
briefs brought the Harper’s article to the Supreme Court’s attention, so the report itself was not in
any meaningful sense “suppressed.” Brief for the ACLU as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at
23 n.11, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (No. 22); Brief of Japanese American
Citizens League as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 107–08, Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214 (1944) (No. 22). The Solicitor General failed to alert the Court that the report was
authentic and the work of a well-regarded officer in the Office of Naval Intelligence, Kenneth
Ringle. IRONS, supra note 11, at 202, 205–06.
53. Korematsu, 584 F. Supp. at 1420.
54. Neil A. Lewis, President Names 15 for Nation’s Top Civilian Honor, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 9,
1998),
https://www.nytimes.com/1998/01/09/us/president-names-15-for-nation-s-top-civilianhonor.html [https://perma.cc/W64R-QLV9].
55. See Adam Liptak, Path to Supreme Court: Speak Capably, Say Little, N.Y. TIMES (July 11,
2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/12/us/politics/12judge.html [https://perma.cc/6P9CGNSU] (reporting that the “basic script” for Justice Sotomayor’s confirmation hearing would
involve rebuking Korematsu).
56. Neal Katyal, Confession of Error: The Solicitor General’s Mistakes During the JapaneseAmerican Internment Cases (May 20, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/blog
/confession-error-solicitor-generals-mistakes-during-japanese-american-internment-cases [https://
perma.cc/X7PV-8XPG].
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a campaign featuring frequent unabashed calls to end immigration by
Muslims, President Trump signed an Executive Order banning entry into the
United States by, among others, all noncitizens arriving from seven Muslimmajority countries.57 A massive public outcry and a federal district court
decision enjoining the enforcement of the order on Establishment Clause and
other grounds led government lawyers back to the drawing board.58 Over the
succeeding months, they placed revised orders and proclamations on the
president’s desk to supplant the original order. These added several nonMuslim-majority countries to the list, removed an exception for members of
Christian minorities in majority-Muslim lands, and otherwise enhanced the
surface neutrality of the program.59
A five-Justice majority upheld the revised program over objections that
it exceeded presidential statutory powers and violated the First Amendment.
The majority, emphasizing the enormity of the President’s powers over
immigration and the facial neutrality of the program, rejected the idea that
President Trump’s actions warranted strict judicial scrutiny.60
The four dissenters questioned the correctness of applying only “rational
basis” scrutiny to the President’s actions, either explicitly in the case of
Justices Sotomayor and Ginsburg61 or implicitly in the case of Justices Breyer
and Kagan.62 Justice Sotomayor went further, waking the sleeping monster
of Korematsu, at least for purpose of display. The majority’s holding, she
argued, was “troubling given the stark parallels between [its] reasoning . . .
and that of Korematsu.”63 She ticked off a list of those parallels: (a) approving
57. Exec. Order No. 13769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017); Michael D. Shear & Helene
Cooper, Trump Bars Refugees and Citizens of 7 Muslim Countries, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/27/us/politics/trump-syrian-refugees.html
[https://perma.cc
/5NKY-KEDC].
58. Eli Rosenberg, Protest Grows ‘Out of Nowhere’ at Kennedy Airport After Iraqis Are
Detained, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/28/nyregion/jfk-proteststrump-refugee-ban.html [https://perma.cc/89CJ-Z5HY]; see Washington v. Trump, No. C170141JLR, 2017 WL 462040, at *2 (W.D. Wash. 2017) (holding that the States showed that they
were “likely to succeed on the merits of the claims that would entitle them to relief”); Motion for
Temporary Restraining Order at 5, 11, 14, Washington v. Trump, 2017 WL 462040 (No.
2:17CV00141) (arguing that the States were likely to succeed on the merits of their claim on a
combination of Equal Protection Clause, Establishment Clause, and Due Process Clause grounds).
59. Exec. Order No. 13780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 (Mar. 6, 2017); Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed.
Reg. 45161 (Sept. 24, 2017); Proclamation No. 9723, 83 Fed. Reg. 15937 (Apr. 10, 2018); see also
Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2436–38, 2442 (2018) (summarizing the revised orders and
proclamations that supplanted the original order).
60. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2418–20 (discussing how Supreme Court precedent mandates the use
of a rational basis standard of review when an executive action is facially neutral).
61. See id. at 2441 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (noting that in other Establishment Clause cases
the Court has imposed a higher level of scrutiny than rational basis).
62. See id. at 2429–33 (Breyer, J., dissenting). While the Breyer dissent does not speak the
language of scrutiny levels, the analysis to which it subjects the immigration program under review
has all the markings of heightened scrutiny.
63. Id. at 2447 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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odious racial discrimination in an executive order; (b) accepting stereotypes
about a minority group’s supposed inability to assimilate; (c) permitting the
government to rely on a vaguely stated national security threat without
revealing the intelligence supporting it; and (d) ignoring “strong evidence
that impermissible hostility and animus motivated the Government’s
policy.”64 The majority, she asserted, was “redeploy[ing] the same dangerous
logic underlying Korematsu and merely replac[ing] one ‘gravely wrong’
decision with another.”65
This provocative attack led Chief Justice Roberts to take out a sword to
finish off the monster of Korematsu. The Chief Justice parried Sotomayor’s
analogy of the travel ban to the military orders affecting Japanese-Americans.
Korematsu, he argued, was a case about “forcibl[y] relocat[ing] . . . U.S.
citizens to concentration camps, solely and explicitly on the basis of race,”
an action that was “objectively unlawful and outside the scope of Presidential
authority.”66 Trump v. Hawaii, by contrast, was a case about “a facially
neutral policy denying certain foreign nationals the privilege of admission”
to the United States, an act “well within executive authority.”67 Despite the
dissimilarities, though, the Chief Justice seized the opportunity to “make
express what is already obvious”: the Korematsu decision was “gravely
wrong the day it was decided, has been overruled in the court of history,
and—to be clear—’has no place in law under the Constitution.’”68
Thus was the monster slain, without a hint of hesitation from any of the
Court’s four other conservatives who joined the Chief Justice’s opinion.
III. Yes, the First Monster Is Dead
When Grendel was slain, the Ring-Danes burst into feasting and
celebration. One might have expected the same reaction to Trump v.
Hawaii—that after decades of decrying the fact that Korematsu had never
been overruled, critics would thrill at its overruling. Oddly, the reaction to
the death of Korematsu has not been joyful. In fact, many critics maintain
that Korematsu did not really die, but just shape-shifted to a new form in
Trump v. Hawaii.69
64. Id.
65. Id. at 2448 (quoting the majority’s admission that Korematsu is “gravely wrong”).
66. Id. at 2423 (majority opinion).
67. Id.
68. Id. (quoting Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 248 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting)).
69. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Trump v. Hawaii: How the Supreme Court Simultaneously
Overturned and Revived Korematsu, 238 YALE L.J. F. 641, 648 (2019), https://
www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/trump-v-hawaii
[https://perma.cc/4YD3-BMGZ]
(“Taken
together, the opinions in Hawaii read like a modern-day adaptation of Korematsu.”); Quinta Jurecic,
The Travel Ban Decision and the Ghost of Korematsu, LAWFARE (June 28, 2018, 8:19 AM), https://
www.lawfareblog.com/travel-ban-decision-and-ghost-korematsu [https://perma.cc/KZW7-9KEC]
(“Now that the opinions are written, however, the connection is clear enough, and both the majority
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This is not a fair characterization of either Trump v. Hawaii or
Korematsu. The Korematsu decision now stands overruled. Perhaps the best
evidence for this proposition comes from Justice Sotomayor, who woke the
monster in the first place. She had every opportunity to contradict the
majority’s assertion that it had successfully overruled Korematsu. Yet she did
not. She did the opposite. “Today,” she wrote, “the Court takes the important
step of finally overruling Korematsu.”70 “This formal repudiation of a
shameful precedent,” she added, “is laudable and long overdue.”71 Those are
not the words of someone who doubts the death of Korematsu.
More importantly, there are just too many differences between President
Trump’s 2017 immigration orders and Lieutenant General John DeWitt’s
1942 exclusion orders to characterize Trump v. Hawaii as a stealth revival of
Korematsu. The Korematsu case was about the power of the federal
government over citizens;72 Trump v. Hawaii was about the power of the
and the dissenters draw it.”); Anil Kalhan, Trump v. Hawaii and Chief Justice Roberts’s
“Korematsu Overruled” Parlor Trick, ACSLAW: EXPERT FORUM (June 29, 2018), https://
www.acslaw.org/acsblog/trump-v-hawaii-and-chief-justice-robertss-korematsu-overruled-parlortrick/ [https://perma.cc/2DA2-V58V] (“Instead, Roberts engaged in a cheap parlor trick: purporting
to ‘overrule’ a narrow, distorted version of Korematsu while simultaneously embracing and
replicating that decision’s actual logic and reasoning in the course of his own decision-making.”);
Anita Sinha, The Supreme Court’s Travel Ban Ruling—Replacing, Not Overruling Korematsu, HILL
(July 1, 2018, 4:00 PM), https://thehill.com/opinion/judiciary/395087-the-supreme-courts-travelban-ruling-replacing-not-overruling-korematsu [https://perma.cc/7VYX-KGD5] (“The Court in
Trump v. Hawaii ultimately extended this good faith presumption of truth to accept the executive’s
contention that, despite evidence suggesting the travel ban is a discriminatory policy motivated by
animosity, the government ordered the ban in the name of national security.”).
70. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2448 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Sotomayor might have quibbled with
the majority’s statement in a different way; she might have argued that the majority’s “overruling”
of Korematsu was ineffective because it was dictum. This would have been an obvious point for her
to make. Chief Justice Roberts could not have been clearer that he did not see the travel ban case as
presenting the same constitutional issue as Korematsu, which makes his words about Korematsu
dictum by definition. Id. at 2423 (majority opinion). That neither Justice Sotomayor nor any other
Justice raised this concern implies that they all view the blow inflicted on Korematsu as genuinely
lethal.
71. Id. at 2448 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
72. Jamal Greene, Eric Yamamoto, and Rachel Oyama note that the exclusion order in
Korematsu applied to citizens and noncitizens alike. See Jamal Greene, Is Korematsu Good Law?,
128 YALE L.J. F. 629, 634 (2019), https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/is-korematsu-good-law
[https://perma.cc/29SU-Y5BN] (“The exclusion order also, and pointedly, did not distinguish
between U.S. citizens and noncitizen Japanese nationals.”); Eric Yamamoto & Rachel Oyama,
Masquerading Behind a Facade of National Security, 128 YALE L.J. F. 688, 714 (2019), https://
www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/masquerading-behind-a-facade-of-national-security
[https://
perma.cc/8NY4-PYTN] (“Second, the forced removal, like Trump’s exclusion orders, targeted
foreign nationals, too. Korematsu was not only about abuse of ‘U.S. citizens.’”). They appear to
suggest that the Trump Court, in casting Korematsu as a case about the exclusion just of citizens,
may have misapprehended the reach of the Korematsu holding and implicitly left the door open to
the racial classification of noncitizens. But if that door is open, it is not Korematsu that opened it.
Korematsu was plainly about the exclusion of people in the position of Fred Korematsu—citizens—
and not about noncitizens, even though the military order applied to both. In his opinion for the
Court, Justice Black said:
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federal government over noncitizens. Korematsu was about what the
government can do to people who are lawfully within United States territory;
Trump v. Hawaii was about what the government can do to people who are
outside the United States. Korematsu was about government orders whose
plain language singled people out because of their ancestry, making their
invidious motivation well-nigh uncontestable; Trump v. Hawaii was about
government orders whose language did not mention any religious group, and
insofar as they mentioned specific nations, specified only a relatively small
subset of those around the globe with sizable Muslim populations. 73 The
orders in Korematsu inflicted the upheaval and trauma of forced uprooting
and relocation on each and every person they touched; Trump v. Hawaii was
about a bar to entering the United States from abroad that applied equally to

[W]e are not unmindful of the hardships imposed by [the military order] upon a large
group of American citizens. Cf. Ex parte Kawato, 317 U.S. 69, 73. But hardships are
part of war, and war is an aggregation of hardships. All citizens alike, both in and out
of uniform, feel the impact of war in greater or lesser measure. Citizenship has its
responsibilities as well as its privileges, and in time of war the burden is always
heavier.
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219 (1944) (emphasis added).Justice Black’s “cf.”
citation to his opinion for the Court in the 1942 Kawato decision is significant because it concerned
the wartime rights of Japanese aliens; the citation signals that the Korematsu Court understood the
situation of noncitizens to present distinct issues. Later, continuing his emphasis on citizenship,
Justice Black added that the Court’s “task would be simple, our duty clear, were this a case involving
the imprisonment of a loyal citizen in a concentration camp because of racial prejudice.” Id. at 223
(emphasis added). The dissenting opinions of Justice Roberts and Justice Jackson similarly focus
closely and repeatedly on the order’s application to citizens. See, e.g., id. at 229 (Roberts, J.,
dissenting) (“The obvious purpose of the orders made, taken together, was to drive all citizens of
Japanese ancestry into Assembly Centers within the zones of their residence, under pain of criminal
prosecution.”) (emphasis added); id. at 242 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“Korematsu was born on our
soil, of parents born in Japan. The Constitution makes him a citizen of the United States by
nativity . . . .”) (emphasis added). That the Court treated the case as posing a question about the
exclusion of citizens and not noncitizens is not surprising; that is exactly how Korematsu’s attorney
framed it. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 20, at 5–6 (“[Korematsu] has no dual citizenship. He
is a loyal citizen who has exercised the rights and performed the duties of citizenship. . . . More
could not be asked or expected of any citizen.”) (emphasis added). The Trump Court should not be
faulted for understanding Korematsu as a case about the rights of citizens because that is what it
was. This is not to say that the question of the rights of noncitizens is unimportant or that classifying
them on racial lines is or should be permissible. It is simply to note that the holding of Korematsu
does not resolve that question.
73. To be sure, Donald Trump said reprehensible things about Muslims on the campaign trail
and after becoming President, things that leave little doubt about his own invidious sentiments. See,
e.g., Jenna Johnson & David Weigel, Donald Trump Calls for “Total” Ban on Muslims Entering
United States, WASH. POST (Dec. 8, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2015/12/07
/e56266f6-9d2b-11e5-8728-1af6af208198_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.9bbe702e8ddc
[https://perma.cc/B5FN-FMW7]. The Executive Order that the Court considered, however, was
neutral on its face, and the Supreme Court has a long history of drawing sharp distinctions between
laws that draw explicit racial or religious lines and laws that do not. Indeed, the Supreme Court even
has a history of setting aside concerns about invidious motivation for facially neutral actions. See
Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 225 (1971) (“It is difficult or impossible for any court to
determine the ‘sole’ or ‘dominant’ motivation behind the choices of a group of legislators.”).
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a person arriving for crucial medical care and a person arriving for a
vacation.74 Each of these is a meaningful distinction.75
In short, it is easy to imagine a world that rationally distinguishes the
government’s ability to push a citizen from place to place inside the country
from its ability to prevent a noncitizen from entering the country. We can
differentiate the two without relying on Korematsu’s endorsement of the
mass exclusion of American citizens from the West Coast.
If there is a disturbing point of connection between Korematsu and
Trump v. Hawaii, it lies not in the language of the challenged orders or the
nature of the burdens the orders impose, but in the Court’s trusting posture
toward the Executive on national security matters.76 There is a troubling
credulity to the majority opinions in both cases. In Korematsu, the
government offered none of its own surveillance data on the supposed
dangers Japanese-Americans posed and no actual military data about the
nature of the looming military threat to the U.S. mainland. Instead, the
government simply asked the Court to take judicial notice of a range of public
records and statements purporting to document those things.77 And the Court
agreed—something it would later come to regret when archival research a
generation later revealed that the Justice Department had not been candid.78
Similarly, in Trump v. Hawaii, the Court looked only at the veneer of
neutrality that government lawyers tacked on to the President’s oft-stated and
oft-tweeted confessions of animus against Muslims.79
In this one way, Trump v. Hawaii does extend the spirit, if not the letter,
of Korematsu. But that is not the same thing as saying that the former fails to

74. This is not to say that a bar to entry does not cause harm to individuals—even great harm to
those kept from joining family in the United States. It is simply to say that all Japanese-Americans
experienced a baseline of extreme harm by being kicked out of their homes, whereas the harms
suffered by those excluded by the travel ban were variable, and in some cases, such as those seeking
to enter the United States for tourism, comparatively minor.
75. Aziz Huq rejects the idea of a meaningful distinction between the impact of the military
orders in Korematsu and the impact of the travel ban on a person seeking entry to the United States.
See Aziz Huq, Article II and Antidiscrimination Norms, 118 MICH. L. REV. 47, 90–93 (2019). Both,
he points out, eventuated in detention, or at least were capable of doing so, which makes the
distinction “less crisp than first appears.” Id. at 91. The key trouble with this position is that by
focusing on the fact or risk of detention, it significantly underdescribes the impacts of the orders.
The military order in Korematsu forced people to abandon their homes and displaced them by
hundreds of miles to places they never wanted to be. The ban in Trump v. Hawaii applies to people
who choose to leave their homes and choose to travel to a place they do want to be. Of course, in
neither context did or do the impacted people choose the detention at the end of the line. But the
only way to avoid a meaningful distinction between the overall impact of the government’s actions
in the two contexts is to ignore everything about the affected person’s experience before detention.
76. Neal Katyal makes this point comprehensively. Katyal, supra note 69, at 649–55.
77. Brief for the United States, supra note 22, at 11 n.2.
78. IRONS, supra note 11, at 202–06.
79. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2409–10, 2420–21 (2018) (justifying the travel ban
on rational basis grounds).
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overrule the latter. On this point—credulity in the face of cursory and
unsubstantiated allegations of threats to national security—Korematsu does
not stand alone. Far from it. In many cases the Supreme Court has accepted
government representations about national security threats rather than
demanding the underlying data.80 In national security contexts the executive
often cannot open its records to scrutiny and its agents to examination without
endangering people, strategy, tactics, and even the well-being of the country
itself.81 The majority’s credulity in Trump v. Hawaii, however blinkered it
may be, has roots in many cases, not just Korematsu.
So yes, the first monster has been slain.82 Korematsu has been overruled.
Never again can a government lawyer cite it to support a decision to force a
racial, ethnic, or religious group away from the place it calls home.83
There is, however, something odd—and importantly so—about the way
in which Chief Justice Roberts went about the task of overruling Korematsu.
Yes, the Chief Justice said that Korematsu was gravely wrong the day it was
decided. But why? What exactly was wrong with it?
If one were to ask this question to any law school graduate of the last
forty or fifty years, she would say that the Court’s error was to promise a
rigorous form of scrutiny of the military’s exclusion orders and then use a
tepid one. “[A]ll legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single
racial group are immediately suspect,” said Justice Black right out of the gate;
“courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny.”84 This form of judicial
review insists that the government can draw racial lines to address only the
most pressing of public problems and to affect only those people who are

80. See Robert M. Chesney, National Security Fact Deference, 95 VA. L. REV. 1361, 1363
(2009) (examining national security fact-deference claims).
81. See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7 (1953) (establishing the evidentiary statesecrets privilege); Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1875) (establishing the categorical
state-secrets bar to suit); United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 225 (4th Cir. 2008) (demonstrating
the use of the “silent witness” rule to protect classified information); see also Classified Information
Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C. app. III §§ 1–16 (2018) (codifying procedures regarding classified
information).
82. I do not mean to suggest that the Trump v. Hawaii decision is not itself a monster of a
different sort—a dangerous precedent in immigration law, perhaps a revival of the troubling-butnever-overruled decision of Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889), also known as
the Chinese Exclusion Case. This is a point that many are making in the literature. See Michael
Kagan, Is the Chinese Exclusion Case Good Law? (The President Is Trying to Find Out), 1 NEV.
L.J. F. 80, 80 (2017), https://scholars.law.unlv.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1002&
context=nljforum [https://perma.cc/S26Q-QS4Z] (drawing parallels between the two cases); Garrett
Epps, The Ghost of Chae Chan Ping, ATLANTIC (Jan. 20, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com
/politics/archive/2018/01/ghost-haunting-immigration/551015/
[https://perma.cc/3DA4-L6VF]
(raising concerns about the revival of the Chinese Exclusion Case). That, however, is not what this
Essay is about.
83. But cf. infra note 134 and accompanying text (discussing Korematsu’s surprising resilience
in intra-governmental policy discussions in the post-9/11 era).
84. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
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causing them. This, surely, was the Court’s error in Korematsu. Protecting
the country from an invasion by hostile forces was, of course, a pressing
need.85 But even if we stipulate that some American citizens of Japanese
ancestry posed a threat of espionage or sabotage,86 we can be confident that
they did not include the ill Japanese-Americans transported to the camps on
stretchers from West Coast hospitals87 or Japanese-American soldiers serving
with distinction in the armed forces.88 Neither, we can say with confidence,
did they include the Japanese-American children who were shipped from Los
Angeles orphanages to the so-called “Children’s Village” at the Manzanar
Relocation Center.89 In the jargon of strict scrutiny, the exclusion orders were
outrageously overinclusive: they touched people they didn’t need to touch.
They were also outrageously underinclusive. If we are to stipulate that
some Americans of Japanese ancestry posed a threat of espionage or
sabotage, we must also stipulate that some American citizens of German or
Italian ancestry posed a similar threat. Yet the Army never ordered the mass
exclusion of American citizens of German or Italian ancestry from one square
inch of U.S. territory.
If one were now to ask the same law student to read Chief Justice
Roberts’s language overruling Korematsu in Trump v. Hawaii, she would end
up scratching her head. The problem in Korematsu was that “[t]he forcible
relocation of U.S. citizens to concentration camps, solely and explicitly on
the basis of race, [was] objectively unlawful and outside the scope of
Presidential authority.”90 This contrasted with President Trump’s action,
which was “well within executive authority and could have been taken by
any other President.”91 The Chief Justice made no mention of strict scrutiny
and no mention of fatal overinclusion or underinclusion. He transformed

85. But see infra note 116 and accompanying text (noting that the Solicitor General
misrepresented the threat of invasion in presenting the Hirabayashi case to the Supreme Court).
86. This is arguably a counterfactual assumption, as the government never arrested an American
citizen of Japanese ancestry on charges of espionage or other forms of subversion. See DAVID COLE,
ENEMY ALIENS 97 (2003) (“None of the interned Japanese was ever charged with, much less
convicted of, espionage, sabotage, or treason.”). But see Eric L. Muller, Betrayal on Trial:
Japanese-American “Treason” in World War II, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1759, 1794 (2004) (relating the
story of the prosecution of three Japanese-American sisters for treason for assisting the escape of
German prisoners of war in Colorado in 1943).
87. See, for example, a photograph of a physician examining an elderly patient in a War
Relocation Authority emergency hospital for evacuees of Japanese ancestry, Clem Albers,
Manzanar, Calif.—Dr. James Goto, ONLINE ARCHIVE OF CAL. (Apr. 2, 1942), https://oac.cdlib.org
/ark:/13030/ft0580021n/?brand=oac4 [https://perma.cc/YW3B-KYXV].
88. See generally C. DOUGLAS STERNER, GO FOR BROKE (2008).
89. Renee Tawa, Childhood Lost: The Orphans of Manzanar, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 11, 1997,
12:00 AM), http://articles.latimes.com/1997-03-11/news/mn-37002_1_manzanar-orphans [https://
perma.cc/P2WM-EZBV].
90. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018) (emphasis added).
91. Id.
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Korematsu into a case—and a mistake—about the boundaries of the powers
of the President. The Chief Justice did not explain why presidential power
does not extend to relocating racial, ethnic, or religious groups of American
citizens during wartime. He merely asserted it.
The trouble is not that that proposition is erroneous; in fact it seems quite
salubrious. The trouble is that the proposition misses what decades of
analysis suggested was the point. The Court’s crucial error in Korematsu was
to tolerate racial line-drawing where it should have been—and pretended to
be—demanding. The error was promising to test racial action in the name of
national security with vigor and then doing it with indulgence. The reason to
overrule Korematsu was to correct that mistake, to make clear that strict
scrutiny means strict scrutiny even in a national-security context involving
racial distinctions.92
IV. Enter the Second Monster
To the Ring-Danes, it mattered little exactly how Beowulf killed
Grendel—with which blade, or with what sort of swing of the arm. What
mattered was that Grendel was dead. In that spirit, this parsing of Chief
Justice Roberts’s rationale for overruling Korematsu in Trump v. Hawaii
might seem like pointless perseveration: Korematsu has been overruled, and
that is all that really matters.
But it matters a great deal. There is a second monster out there, a
Grendel’s mother, just as menacing as Korematsu, perhaps more. It has been
in the shadows since World War II, but we have paid it no mind. If it should
strike—and there is reason to fear it could—we will want to know that
Korematsu was overruled for the right reasons. Those reasons might prove
our only protection.
The new monster facing us is Hirabayashi v. United States. Hirabayashi
was a constitutional challenge to another army order entered against
Japanese-Americans pursuant to Executive Order 9066.93 It imposed a duskto-dawn curfew on all people of Japanese ancestry along the West Coast—
citizens and noncitizens alike—and came a few weeks before the exclusion
order that Fred Korematsu fought.94 It imposed no such curfew on American
citizens of German or Italian ancestry.95 At the time the Army imposed the
order, Gordon Hirabayashi was a twenty-four-year-old American citizen of
92. Jamal Greene’s thoughtful and detailed elaboration of this and related ideas about the
ambiguities of what in Korematsu the Trump Court might have overruled is valuable. See generally
Greene, supra note 72 (discussing how the Supreme Court’s claim that the infamous Korematsu
decision was overruled is “both empty and grotesque”).
93. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 83, 85–86 (1943).
94. Proclamation No. 3, 7 Fed. Reg. 2543 (Mar. 24, 1942).
95. See id. (declaring and establishing that the order applies to “all alien Japanese, all alien
Germans, all alien Italians, and all persons of Japanese ancestry”).
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Japanese ancestry living in Seattle.96 He defied the curfew and refused to
report for exclusion and was prosecuted in federal court for the two acts of
defiance in separate counts, one for the curfew violation and one for the
exclusion violation.97 He was tried and convicted in federal district court in
Seattle in October 1942 and challenged his conviction up to the Supreme
Court. Due to a quirk of appellate criminal procedure,98 the Court addressed
only Hirabayashi’s challenge to the curfew, leaving the challenge to
exclusion for another day.99
The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed Hirabayashi’s conviction in
June 1943. The Court began its analysis of his equal protection challenge
with an even harsher indictment of racial discrimination than it would pen a
year and a half later in Korematsu: “Distinctions between citizens solely
because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people
whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.”100 Such
distinctions, said Chief Justice Stone, had “often been held to be a denial of
equal protection”—and would be such a denial in Hirabayashi were it not for
the fact that “the danger of espionage and sabotage, in time of war and of
threatened invasion, calls upon the military authorities to scrutinize every
relevant fact bearing on the loyalty of populations in the danger areas.”101
The Court undertook a lengthy account of “the conditions with which
the President and Congress were confronted in the early months of 1942,
many of which . . . were then peculiarly within the knowledge of the military
authorities.”102 Those conditions were both external—the threat facing the
country from without—and internal—the threat facing the country from
within. Relying on information fed to it by the Solicitor General, the Court
reported that at the time the Army imposed the curfew, it was “fac[ing] the
danger of invasion”103 of the West Coast by the Japanese military, an area

96. See IRONS, supra note 11, at 89–90 (stating that Hirabayashi, at the age of twenty-four, had
just started his senior year at the University of Washington in Seattle when the curfew became
effective).
97. See id. at 91–92 (“[T]he federal grand jury in Seattle returned an indictment that charged
Hirabayashi with two violations of Public Law 503, the first for failure to report for evacuation and
the second for curfew violation.”).
98. The quirk of criminal appellate procedure is called the “concurrent sentence doctrine.” It
says that a federal court will decline to consider questions on counts of conviction if it finds at least
one valid count of conviction resulting in a concurrent sentence. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S.
784, 787–89 (1969) (discussing the history of the Court’s “concurrent sentence doctrine”
jurisprudence); see also Kang, supra note 45, at 944–45 (indicating that Chief Justice Stone utilized
the concurrent sentence doctrine to avoid the exclusion issue in Hirabayashi).
99. That day would turn out to be Korematsu v. United States in December 1944.
100. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 93–94.
103. Id. at 94.
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densely dotted with military bases and war manufacturing plants.104 Along
the coast, Chief Justice Stone noted, were some 112,000 people of Japanese
ancestry, two-thirds of them U.S. citizens, a group purportedly marked by
their “solidarity” and their failure to assimilate.105 Noncitizen parents sent
their citizen children to Japanese language after-school programs where,
according to the Court, they imbibed “Japanese nationalistic propaganda”
that “cultivat[ed] allegiance to Japan.”106 The noncitizens maintained
contacts with Japanese consulates, which, the Court related, had “been
deemed a ready means for the dissemination of propaganda and for the
maintenance of the influence of the Japanese government.”107 All of this left
the Japanese—citizens and noncitizens alike—cut off from the white
population, and probably “irritat[ed]” by the isolation they felt.108 This, in
turn, “may well have tended to increase . . . their attachments to Japan and its
institutions.”109
Having drawn this bleak landscape of possibly imminent invasion and
this cloak-and-dagger caricature of isolated and bitter Japanese-Americans,
the Court made quick work of Hirabayashi’s equal protection claim. The
government, “in the crisis of war and of threatened invasion,” had adopted
public safety measures—including a curfew—“based upon the recognition of
facts and circumstances which indicate[d] that a group of one national
extraction may menace that safety more than others.”110 That curfew was “not
wholly beyond the limits of the Constitution and [was] not to be condemned
merely because in other and in most circumstances racial distinctions are
irrelevant.”111
The Hirabayashi opinion had little chance to reverberate because
Korematsu came along promptly and, in a sense, supplanted it. There was
little reason to pay attention to a case permitting the military to confine people
to their homes once there was a case allowing it to drive people from their
homes. There was irony in Hirabayashi’s disappearance from the scene,
because Korematsu itself leaned all over it. It was “[i]n the light of the
principles we announced in the Hirabayashi case”112 that the Korematsu
Court validated mass exclusion. Fred Korematsu sought to contest the
various factual assumptions that animated the Court’s opinion in

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id. at 95.
Id. at 96.
Id. at 97.
Id. at 98.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 101.
Id.
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 217 (1944).
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Hirabayashi, but the Court simply repeated and readopted them.113 Justice
Frankfurter, “unable to see how the legal considerations that led to the
decision in Hirabayashi . . . fail[ed] to sustain the military order”114
commanding mass racial exclusion, confirmed Hirabayashi’s status as
Korematsu’s progenitor.
As the decades passed and the criticisms of Korematsu piled up,
Hirabayashi slipped by virtually unnoticed. Gordon Hirabayashi saw his
conviction vacated on a coram nobis petition in 1986115—much like Fred
Korematsu had in 1984, and on much the same grounds—but that impugned
only his criminal conviction. It did not—indeed, could not—invalidate the
Supreme Court’s decision approving the curfew. Acting Solicitor General
Neal Katyal included Hirabayashi alongside Korematsu in his “Confession
of Error” in 2011, which made clear that the deceptions marring the litigation
of Korematsu infected the Hirabayashi litigation too.116 But that has been the
extent of the criticism.117
It is actually more worrisome than that. Unlike Korematsu, which by the
1980s had become a case no judge would mention in polite company,
Hirabayashi has retained a modicum of vitality as precedent. In 2004, Justice
Thomas cited the case in his dissent in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld118—and not for a
salutary idea like the “odious[ness of racial classifications] to a free
people,”119 but for the darker notion that courts owe extreme deference to
executive factfinding.120 That such deference had run the Court aground in
Hirabayashi itself seemed not to faze him. Other Justices cited the case

113. Id. at 218.
114. Id. at 224 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
115. Hirabayashi v. United States, 627 F. Supp. 1445, 1457 (W.D. Wash. 1986), aff’d, 828 F.2d
591 (9th Cir. 1987).
116. Katyal, supra note 56. Katyal might have gone even further in condemning Hirabayashi,
as then-recent research had established that the Solicitor General’s Office committed even more
misconduct in that case than it later did in Korematsu. In Hirabayashi, the Solicitor General
repeatedly insisted that in March 1942 the Army was preparing specifically for a “Japanese
invasion” of the West Coast, but archival evidence demonstrates that the Army was in fact preparing
for no such thing and Justice Department lawyers almost certainly knew it. Eric L. Muller,
Hirabayashi and the Invasion Evasion, 88 N.C. L. REV. 1333, 1336–38 (2010).
117. Dennis Hutchinson’s careful excavation of Justice Jackson’s unpublished concurring
opinion in the Hirabayashi case is illuminating, but it does not address the merits or demerits of the
Court’s Hirabayashi opinion. Dennis J. Hutchinson, “The Achilles Heel” of the Constitution:
Justice Jackson and the Japanese Exclusion Cases, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 455.
118. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
119. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943).
120. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 584 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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without evident disdain in 1963,121 1967,122 1971,123 and 1978.124 The
Solicitor General cited Hirabayashi approvingly in a merits brief defending
preventive pretrial detention in the Supreme Court in 1986.125 And as recently
as June of 2018, the case materialized in a brief filed by Department of
Defense lawyers in a case pending before a military commission at
Guantanamo Bay.126
Still alive and on the prowl, Hirabayashi can do real damage. Compared
to wholesale ouster from an entire chunk of the continent, a curfew is a pretty
modest imposition. Korematsu was about the trauma of departure: rapacious
buyers pawing through their departing Japanese neighbors’ belongings at
hastily arranged “evacuation sales,” panicked families trying to fit their
lifetimes into a few pieces of luggage, farmers leaving their crops unattended
to rot in the fields, anxious parents calming frightened children, tearful
children saying goodbye to family pets. Hirabayashi, by contrast, was about
making it home before dark and not leaving the house too early in the
morning. The intrusion on people’s lives Korematsu ratified was among the
greatest imaginable: a forced internal mass exile of a kind unseen in America
since perhaps the Trail of Tears. Curfews, on the other hand, happen all the
time, at least comparatively speaking; they’re enforced in the wake of natural
disasters and civil unrest. Many local governments have juvenile curfew laws
on the books.127
This is not to say that the curfew on Japanese-Americans did not inflict
indignities on all, or grave harms on some—for example, night shift workers,
or people suffering nighttime health crises who had to defy the law to go to
the hospital. It is simply to say that a huge gulf of suffering and trauma
separates curfew from exclusion. The cases are, as we like to say,
distinguishable. It is not difficult to mentally sketch out a brief that would
argue the distinction, or a judicial opinion that would endorse it.

121. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 n.12 (1963); id. at 213 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
122. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 270 (1967) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
123. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 722 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring).
124. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 287 (1978); cf. Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 214 (1995) (referencing Hirabayashi’s “most unfortunate results”).
125. Brief for the United States at 17, United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1986) (No. 8687), 1986 WL 727530, at *17.
126. Nicole Goodkind, Trump Administration Uses Japanese Internment Example to Deny
Rights to Detainees, NEWSWEEK (June 15, 2018, 5:14 PM), https://www.newsweek.com
/guantanamo-bay-donald-trump-japanese-internment-980049 [https://perma.cc/3NNY-W93A].
127. For just one example, see DALLAS, TEX., CODE § 31-33(b) (2019), http://
library.amlegal.com/nxt/gateway.dll/Texas/dallas/cityofdallastexascodeofordinances/volumeii/
chapter31offenses-miscellaneous/articleigeneral2?f=templates$fn=default.htm$3.0$vid=amlegal:
dallas_tx$anc=JD_31-33 [https://perma.cc/XS28-V8FA].
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The consequences of that thought experiment are concerning. One can
imagine an array of race- or religion-based government intrusions and
impositions that are an order of magnitude milder than mass exclusion. Mass
surveillance; mass registration; mandatory identity cards; mass federal job
layoffs; mass loyalty inquests—the list can expand to the limits of a person’s
ability to imagine the fear and anger of a nation reeling from a terror attack.
All of these would have a potential constitutional pedigree in a world where
Korematsu is dead but its mother, Hirabayashi, survives.
V.

Slaying the Second Monster

When Grendel’s mother appeared at the mead hall to avenge her son’s
death, the Ring-Danes were sleeping off the aftereffects of their banquet
revelry. Assuming the mead hall safe, Beowulf had departed and was
slumbering elsewhere. This gave Grendel’s mother the chance to wreak
havoc, killing a Danish prince and making off safely to her underwater lair.
Beowulf had no choice but to dive into the lake and challenge her on her turf,
with a blade forged for a giant. Only after an epic struggle did Beowulf kill
Grendel’s mother.
Hirabayashi is still on the prowl, and we have been sleeping. If the case
is to be overruled, how might it be accomplished?
Speedily, one hopes. When the Supreme Court overruled Plessy v.
Ferguson’s128 separate-but-equal doctrine in Brown v. Board of Education,129
the only thing that was clear was that the Equal Protection Clause would no
longer tolerate racial segregation in public education. Segregation by law,
though, was a pervasive practice across the American South. Uncertainty
briefly reigned, as people puzzled over whether segregation at other public
facilities might survive. The Court put the matter quickly to rest, condemning
segregation at golf courses130 and beaches131 in per curiam opinions that did
nothing more than cite Brown. The message was clear: Brown did not state a
rule about public education only. It stated a broad legal principle about the
categorical invalidity of state-sponsored racial segregation wherever it
cropped up.
In the follow-through to overruling Korematsu, the Supreme Court
would do well to follow the Plessy example by announcing that Hirabayashi
is also dead. The Court should make clear that Korematsu wasn’t just wrong
on its facts but embodied a broadly illegitimate rule.
And what is that rule? This is where the oddity of Chief Justice Roberts’s
language in Trump v. Hawaii really matters. The Chief Justice said that
128.
129.
130.
131.

163 U.S. 537 (1896).
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Holmes v. Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (per curiam).
Mayor of Baltimore City v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (per curiam).
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Korematsu was wrong because the mass exclusion order was “outside the
scope of Presidential authority.”132 But that is not why Korematsu was wrong,
or at least it is not the most important reason. Korematsu was wrong because
it upheld a government order that cavalierly and needlessly impacted
Japanese-American orphans, tubercular patients in sanitaria, and soldiers in
the U.S. Army, while leaving American citizens of German and Italian
ancestry untouched. It was wrong because it made a mess of strict scrutiny,
tolerating absurd over- and under-inclusion when it ought to have tolerated
none, or almost none.
Hirabayashi is wrong for just the same reasons. The orphans and the
hospital patients and the soldiers were just as needlessly placed under curfew
as they were later excluded, while American citizens of German and Italian
ancestry remained free to stroll the nighttime streets. The essential problem
of Hirabayashi, just as with Korematsu, is not that the orders against
Japanese-Americans fell outside the scope of presidential power. To frame
the problem as a flaw of government structure, a president straying outside
the boundaries of his authority, is to imply that the other branch—Congress—
could do what the president could not. But that cannot be right; surely a
statute directing racial curfew and exclusion would have had the same
constitutional defects as an executive or military order. No, the problem in
the cases is not one of transgressed powers in branches of government; it is
one of individual rights.
There is reason to believe that the Court that decided the two JapaneseAmerican constitutional cases of World War II would agree that overruling
one entails overruling the other. Justice Black worked hard to tie Korematsu
to the earlier Hirabayashi case, essentially adopting the Hirabayashi Court’s
findings about the internal threats posed by Japanese-Americans and the
external threats posed by the Japanese military. Justice Black thought he was
doing no new doctrinal work in Korematsu; he was simply upholding
exclusion “[i]n the light of the principles we announced in the Hirabayashi
case.”133 One could therefore argue that the overruling of Korematsu in
Trump v. Hawaii forcefully implied the overruling of Hirabayashi.
But we do not have a doctrine of silent overruling by inference. The
Court has to come out and say it, and it should do so. Regrettably, the fate of
Hirabayashi is uncertain in the wake of Trump v. Hawaii. We are living in a
time when a domestic terror attack—another September 11—might at any
moment be seconds away. That is an inauspicious moment for uncertainty
about whether racial or religious discrimination short of internal exile
violates equal protection. We recently learned that in the immediate wake of
the September 11 attacks, high-ranking Justice Department lawyers debated
132. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018).
133. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 217–18 (1944).
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reviving Korematsu in service of racial profiling at airports.134 That
frightening fact alone should prompt action on Hirabayashi.
The first monster is dead, but the second one lives. At any moment she
might be upon us as we slumber. The time to strike is now.

134. See Email from Helgard C. Walker, Assoc. White House Counsel, to Alberto Gonzales,
White House Counsel (Jan. 17, 2002, 10:12 AM), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc
/08-21-18%20GWB%20Document%20Production%20-%20Leahy,%20Coons,%20Blumenthal,%
20Booker%20(Released%2009-06-18).pdf [https://perma.cc/GA8L-XRPZ] (theorizing that racial
profiling at airports could be legal under principles derived from Korematsu).

